We consider a class of timing games which are suggested from a timing problem 
for putting some kind of farm products on the market. $N$ players, 
Player $1, 2, \ldots, n$, take possession of the right 
to put some kind of farm products at any time in $[0, 1]$. 
The price of them increases with time so long as none of the $n$ players 
sell them, however, if one of the $n$ players puts his farm products 
on the market the price falls discontinuously and then increases with time. 
Such discontinuous falls in the price of farm product arise successively 
until $n$ players complete to sell. All players have 
to put their farm product within the unit interval $[0, 1]$. 
In such a situation, each player wishes to delay action as late as possible, 
but does not wish to delay so late that his opponents can put earlier. 
We assume that all players learn neither when nor whether their opponents 
have put their farm products on the market. 
Each of the $n$ players has to decide his action time. 
This model yields us a certain class of $n$-person non-zero sum infinite games.